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INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND THE
ALCHEMIST'S LESSON: YOU CAN'T TURN
REGULATIONS INTO GOLD
I. INTRODUCTION
"Taking" clauses in the federal and state constitutions
mandate that private property will not be appropriated for
public use without the payment of just compensation.1 Sepa-
rate clauses in the fifth and fourteenth amendments and in
state constitutions guarantee that citizens cannot be deprived
of property without due process of law.
The existence of separate due process and just compensa-
tion clauses strongly suggests that the framers of these docu-
ments intended to separate the sovereign powers of eminent
0 1981 by Susan Bayerd
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA
CONST. art. 4, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22; CAL. CONST. art.1, § 19; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 8;
FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2-301; HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 18; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 1, § 14; ILL. CONsT. art. 1, § 15; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21; IOWA CONST.
art 1, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 4; Ky. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; ME.
CONST. art. 1, § 21; MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 10; MICH. CONST.
art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13; MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 17; Mo. CONsT. art 1, § 26;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 14; Num. CONST. art. 1, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.J.
CONST. art. 1, § 20; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7; N.D. CONST. art.
1, § 14; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19; OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 24; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 18; PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17; S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21; Tax. CONST. art. 1, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. 1; § 22;
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16; W. VA.
CONST. art. 3, § 9; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 13; WvO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 32, 33. New Hamp-
shire and North Carolina have no such constitutional provisions but courts have held
that compensation must be paid to the property owner upon appropriation of hisproperty. Additionally, twenty-three states have broader provisions than the fifth
amendment, requiring compensation whenever private property is taken or damaged
for public use. ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §19; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2-301; ILL. CONsT. art. 1, § 15; Ky.
CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art 1, § 2; MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 17;
Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 20; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 24; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 13; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22; VA. CONST. art. 1, §
11; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 33.
Additionally the Alabama constitution has been interpreted as requiring compensa-
tion for damaged property. See Montgomery v. Maddox, 89 Ala. 181, 7 So. 433 (1890).
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domain and the police power." Each power, when improperly
exercised, results in a different remedy for the aggrieved
party.
Although the requirement of procedural due process' ap-
plies to both eminent domain and police power actions, an ad-
judication that property has been confiscated in eminent do-
main results in entitlement to money damages. No such
compensation is required, however, when the government ex-
ercises its police power to regulate the use of property.4 The
corollary to this rule and the premise of this comment is that
if the regulation is adjudged unreasonable or arbitrary, the
property owner is properly entitled only to declaratory relief
or mandamus.
During the evolution of American property law the dis-
tinction between eminent domain and police power regula-
tions has not been consistently observed. As a result, courts,
property owners, and commentators alike are confused both
as to the definition of "taking" and as to the appropriate rem-
edy to be applied if a taking is found to have occurred.8
Prior to the Civil War, the United States Supreme Court
did not consider many taking cases. Not until the last third
2. See 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (rev. 3d ed. 1979) which reads in
part:
The distinguishing characteristic between eminent domain and the po-
lice power is that the former involves the taking of property while the
latter involves the regulation of such property to prevent the use thereof
in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest. The police power
may be loosely described as the power of the sovereign to prevent per-
sons under its jurisdiction from conducting themselves or using their
property to the detriment of the general welfare.
See also Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.
2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
The historical derivations of the due process clause and the eminent domain con-
cept are decidedly disparate. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
ISSUE 53-104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as THE TAKING ISSUE].
3. Due process, whether procedural or substantive, is of course a vast and vague
concept. For an interesting treatment of substantive due process in the area of intan-
gible property, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
4. Under the police power a governing body may reasonably restrict the use of
private property in the interest of advancing the public health, safety, or general wel-
fare. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
5. See Bozung, Judicially Created Zoning with Compensation: California's
Brief Experiment with Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENv. L.J. 67 (1979).
6. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 2, at 115. The authors also point out that
during this time period the Court was actively incorporating certain Bill of Rights
provisions into the fourteenth amendment due process clause, so that by the end of
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of the nineteenth century did the Court begin to formulate a
federal approach to the taking clause.
In 1887, the Court decided Mugler v. Kansas. Justice
Harlan, writing for the majority, established a clear distinc-
tion between police power regulations and eminent domain
actions, observing that the former, while impairing the use of
private property, do not constitute takings8 while the latter
result in a "physical invasion of the real estate of the private
owner, and a practical ouster of his possession," entitling the
owner to compensation.
Justice Harlan thus differentiated police power regula-
tions enacted to prohibit certadn uses of property, but leaving
title in the owner, from eminent domain actions culminating
in the government's taking possession and title to the prop-
erty itself. The Mugler opinion identified the criterion for a
valid regulation as "a real or substantial relation to the [ob-
jects of protecting] the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety."10 In short, the test for a valid regulation is a
rational relationship to the public welfare.
Thirty five years later, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes redirected the course
of takings law by declaring that "the general rule at least, is
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."" Jus-
tice Holmes thus erased the hitherto clear qualitative distinc-
tions between police power and eminent domain by character-
izing eminent domain as police power "gone to far," and
inserted in its place an operational model in which the two
powers existed along a continuum and were differentiated by
degree rather than kind. After Pennsylvania Coal, the Su-
preme Court all but retired from the field of takings law'8 and
the century "it was clear the states were governed by the taking clause." Id.
7. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, a Kansas statute prohibited the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors. Mugler owned a brewery which, under the statute,
was required to cease operation and thus became relatively worthless. Mugler alleged
a compensable taking.
8. Id. at 667-68.
9. Id. (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871)).
10. Id. at 661.
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The regulation at issue in Pennsylvania Coal prohib-
ited the.owner of sub-surface mining rights from taking coal in such a way as to cause
subsidence of dwellings on the surface.
12. Id. at 415.
13. THE TAKING IssuE, supra note 2, at 138.
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has, until recently, appeared reluctant to address the issue. 4
Little controversy surrounds the government's traditional
use of its eminent domain power to appropriate privately-held
land, provided the owner is compensated fairly. When land-
owners assert, however, that their property-or its market
value-has been "taken" by the operation of a legislatively
imposed use regulation, the owner's entitlement to compensa-
tion depends on whether police power enactments are viewed
as qualitatively different from eminent domain actions or
merely as like in kind, but quantitatively distinct.
Under Justice Harlan's separate powers approach, the
landowner's remedy in challenging the validity of a regulation
is limited to declaratory relief and mandamus, while under
Justice Holmes' continuum approach the landowner is also
entitled to seek money damages under a theory of inverse con-
demnation. Yet a continuum analysis seems to spawn a host
of problems. Aside from creating an initial problem of when
and where to draw the line between police power and eminent
domain, this approach generates the questions of what consti-
tutes "property,"15 the taking of which entitles a landowner to
damages, and what measure should be employed in assessing
"just" compensation. Further, these questions must all be an-
swered simultaneously in order to ascertain whether govern-
ment regulation has gone too far and a taking has occurred.
The end result has been labeled by commentators as the
"crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine. ' '
On the other hand, recent state supreme court decisions,
both in California and New York, have returned to Justice
Harlan's separate powers approach, and may signal its re-
newed vitality in American takings law.
This comment contends that judicial adherence to Justice
Holmes' continuum or "gone too far" approach generates re-
sults that are unfavorable for governments and claimants
alike. A return to Justice Harlan's position that regulations
emanating from the police power are qualitatively different
from exercises of eminent domain power and should be tested
14. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.
2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); see generally Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1962).
15. Sax, supra note 14, at 51.
16. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Su-
preme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 105.
[Vol. 21
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under the rational relationship standard will result in simpler
classification and application of proper remedies in taking
cases.
This comment first explores and criticizes recent federal
takings cases that employ the continuum approach and apply,
in a rather random manner, various "indices" of a taking. Sec-
ondly, several recent state court decisions that reject the con-
tinuum theory and which may presage the reemergence of the
separate powers approach are examined. The results of adher-
ence to this "separation" approach with its reliance on the
reasonableness standard are then compared with the results
obtained under the continuum theory. Finally, practical and
theoretical benefits and detriments to claimants and govern-
ments under each theory are assessed.
II. BASIS OF THE CONTINUUM THEORY IN LAW
As previously stated, the continuum theory can be traced
to Justice Holmes' dictum in Pennsylvania Coal that, "if a
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 7
Holmes clearly espoused this matter of degree viewpoint when
he characterized eminent domain actions as exercises of police
power "gone too far." Although the remedy granted in Penn-
sylvania Coal was invalidation of the offending regulation and
not compensation, Holmes' statement created a great deal of
legal confusion by suggesting that the proper remedy for ex-
cessive regulation must inevitably be monetary compensa-
tion.' 8 Underlying Justice Holmes' dictum, and implicit in the
continuum approach, is the assumption that courts may some-
how transmute ultra vires police power actions into lawful ex-
ercises of eminent domain." Excessive regulation, therefore, is
characterized as a "taking" and the device of inverse condem-
nation 0 is applied as a means of affording monetary relief.
There is no constitutional basis to support Justice Holmes'
17. 260 U.S. at 393.
18. See Bozung, supra note 5, at 69.
19. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Va-
lidity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439 (1973-74), which terms the con-
tinuum theory judicial language compelled by neither legal doctrine nor existing case
law.
20. Inverse condemnation is defined in 22A WORDS AND PHRASES 231 (West
1958) as follows: "Inverse or reverse condemnation contemplates a situation in which
the property has been taken by the exercise of the power of eminent domain but
without any payment of compensation therefor having been made."
1981]
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position.2
III. MAJOR TAKING INDICES AND THE CONTINUUM THEORY
Holmes never suggested an answer to the question of
where to draw a line between eminent domain and the police
power. He preferred to advocate ad hoc decisions, and ob-
served that "the question depends on the particular facts.
22
Although courts applying his approach have developed a
multitude of indices for evaluating alleged takings,23 they gen-
erally employ one of the following four methods or "tests" to
determine whether the operation of a regulation has effected a
taking of private property for which compensation must be
offered.2 4 These tests are rather like a blind person's attempt
to describe an elephant; they are insufficient because no one
test is definitive in all factual situations.
A. Physical Invasion
When governmental action results in a physical invasion
of property, compensation is never denied.2 5 This is equally
true for formal expropriations and for actions that have the
effect of allowing general public use or governmental occupa-
tion of a fundamental attribute of property. Thus, when a city
temporarily stores construction materials on a landowner's lot,
a compensable encroachment has occurred.2 6 Even a physical
invasion as minor as the installation of a public sidewalk
along the edge of a lot results in compensation to the owner of
the land. The fact that the invasion may be practically trifling
from the owner's point of view does not diminish the govern-
21. See generally THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 2, at 124-38; Note, supra note
19, at 1445-46.
22. 123 U.S. at 623.
23. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
165 (1974) for a comprehensive, though superficial, compilation of major taking
indices.
24. See generally Sax, supra note 14; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAv.
L. REV. 1165, (1967); Berger, supra note 23.
25. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1184; Sax, supra note 14, at 46; Berger, supra
note 23, at 170-71; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power: The Search
for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1971).
26. E.g., Herman v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947);
Granone v. County of Los Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965),
where flooding was called a temporary taking and found compensable.
[Vol. 21
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ment's duty to reimburse. The rationale is simply that under
the Constitution, the owner has a right to undisturbed posses-
sion of his land until it has been condemned according to
law.27
Historically, only physical encroachment and occupation
of property resulted in compensable takings.28 There are two
serious shortcomings of the physical invasion test. First, it can
be used to identify when compensation must be paid (i.e.,
when property is invaded physically) but cannot be used to
indicate when compensation should be denied. It does not
deal adequately with the concept of impairment or diminution
of beneficial use or value of the land.
Secondly, the test does not deal consistently with com-
paratively harmless invasions, (e.g., easements for utility
lines) nor with non-physical or intermittent invasions,2' treat-
ing the former as takings, but not the latter. Because compen-
sation is usually calculated as a ratio of the total market value
of the property compared to the percentage taken, the result
can be substantial compensation for nominal physical harm, 0
yet no compensation for substantial but non-physical govern-
mental interference.
B. Nuisance or Harm-Benefit Analysis
Another common analysis identified with the continuum
approach is based on the notion that uses which are found to
be noxious or harmful may be prohibited without compensa-
27. 3 P. NicHOLS, supra, note 2, §§ 10.7(1), 25.41(2), states:
[W]hen land has been actually entered and put to a public use, or some
permanent structure has been erected upon it, there is taking in the
constitutional sense no matter how trivial the pecuniary injury may be
or how little the owner's use of his property has been interfered with,
since he has a constitutional right to undisturbed possession of his land
until it has been condemned according to law.
28. For an interesting treatment of the early history of eminent domain, see
Bassett, Private Hospitals and the Public Right: Needed Standards of Consent for
the Statutory Delegation of the Power of Eminent Domain, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 53
(1976).
29. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), is an ex-
ample of non-physical invasion. In Central Eureka the War Production Board shut
down privately owned gold mines for the purpose of inducing miners who were in
short supply to go into more essential war work. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946), dealing with aircraft overflights, is illustrative of intermittent invasion.
30. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1185 n.39.
1981]
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tion.s1 Accordingly, the distinction between compensable and
non-compensable governmental impositions may depend on
whether the imposition restrains conduct or property uses
that are harmful to others. For example, given a situation in
which "the public simply requires one of its members to stop
making a nuisance of himself,"82 governmental actions
designed to limit or prohibit the complained-of activity are
non-compensable.
This second type of analysis also suffers serious short-
comings. In application it fails to recognize that in certain cir-
cumstances it may be necessary to regulate neutral conduct
that does not constitute a true nuisance. Such neutral conduct
is neither inherently "bad" nor "noxious." As a result, this
test may fail to justify even the most common zoning deci-
sions where the "nuisances" may simply be innocent uses of
property infelicitously located.83
Another major failure of the nuisance analysis is that it
does not assign priorities to uses. That is, it fails to identify
which of two mutually incompatible uses should be regarded
as a "nuisance. 34 In this sense the "test" is not a true test
because the court is left without decision-making guidelines
and must often resort to ad hoc considerations.
The now famous case of Hadacheck v. Sebastian" is il-
lustrative. There, a profitable and otherwise lawful brickworks
built on an isolated plot of clay-rich land was eventually sur-
rounded by residential development. The brickworks was
deemed a nuisance and was required to cease operation with-
out compensation to the owner. Likewise, in Miller v.
Schoene,se the Court approved the destruction of ornamental
cedar trees without compensation to their owner after they
were found to harbor a disease fatal to nearby income-produc-
31. Sax, supra note 14, at 47; Michelman, supra note 24, at 1196; Berger, supra
note 23, at 172; Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation, A Legislative Pro-
spectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAWYER, 1, 19-20 (1967).
32. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1196.
33. A harmless use in an inappropriate place may be a nuisance: "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in a wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
34. Michelman, supra note 24 at 1198.
35. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). While the Court there held that the brickworks' owner
had no vested right to continue operation in view of changed circumstances, later
courts and commentators have applied nuisance rationales to the case in strenuous
effort to justify its result.
36. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
[Vol. 21
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ing apple trees. In neither Hadacheck nor Miller is it clear
just which party was the true nuisance.3 7
Because the nuisance test cannot adequately describe
what a nuisance is, in many circumstances it cannot accu-
rately be applied to determine when compensation is appro-
priate. As a result, the test deals inadequately with legislative
action designed to regulate seemingly neutral conduct. Fur-
thermore, since it does not determine the relative value of in-
compatible uses, it creates an extra burden for the courts in
the guise of providing a standard. At best the nuisance test
provides only a very general rule of when compensation defi-
nitely should not be paid.
C. The Balancing Test-Social Gains Versus Private Losses
A third test commonly used under the continuum theory
is the balancing test. This test is directed toward establishing
the validity of legislation and thus does not qualitatively dis-
tinguish police power from eminent domain power. The test
involves a weighing of society's need for the regulation against
the harm that will be visited on the individual or group af-
fected by the regulation." If individual losses are outweighed
by social gains, the legislation is upheld. 9
Two very basic problems attend the balancing approach.
First, it is based on the questionable assumption that the in-
terests of a specific individual may somehow be separated and
weighed against those of a "society" of which he is a member.
By its very nature the test is subjective and imprecise, requir-
ing the isolation of and the assignment of comparative weights
to a variety of complicated interests that in fact cannot be
meaningfully quantified or compared. This test therefore gen-
erates the obvious risk that the individual will find his rights
entirely balanced away in the name of serving the public
interest.
On the other hand, the balancing test poses the subtler
problem of the effect of judicial reevaluation of the validity of
legislative measures.40 A finding that individual losses out-
37. See Penn Central Transp. Co., v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 126
(1977).
38. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1193; Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 17.
39. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 1192 n.62.
40. Id. at 1195.
19811
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weigh social gains results in a per se rejection of the legisla-
tion. Since the balance must be restruck with each shift in
perception of society's "need," judicial action of this type runs
a substantial risk of creating wholesale unfair-
ness-effectively, tyranny of the minority-under the pre-
tense of vindicating individual rights.
D. The Diminution in Value Test
The diminution in value standard is perhaps based on a
confusion of "damages" with "damage,"41 since the accepted
standard for measuring compensation in eminent domain is
diminution of value. This standard takes as its yardstick of
compensability the magnitude of harm suffered by the claim-
ant."2 Unlike the physical invasion and nuisance tests, the
magnitude of harm standard is usually applied when examin-
ing regulations of "innocent" property uses and is therefore
often applied in zoning cases.'0
Correctly applied this test compares the value of the
claimant's entire parcel of property before imposition of the
restriction with the value of the parcel afterward. The more
nearly all value is removed, the more likely the court will con-
clude that compensation is due. Courts, however, are fre-
quently confused as to whether the diminution in value is to
be determined by comparing pre- and post-regulation values
of all the claimant's properties, of the particular parcel in iso-
lation, or of the specifically affected property right, such as an
acknowledged development right."
Simply stated, the courts do not know which "property"
they should evaluate-the claimant's entire holdings or the
41. The California Supreme Court in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
508, 518, 542 P.2d 237, 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 372 (1975), rejected the equation of
the two concepts:
Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between the "damaged" property
which is a requisite for a finding of compensability and the dam-
ages by which courts measure compensation due. Reasoning back-
wards, plaintiffs erroneously contend that since they can calculate
damages... they must have been "damaged" within the mean-
ing of the state constitution.
42. Sax, supra note 14, at 50; Michelman, supra note 24, at 1190; Van Alstyne,
supra note 31, at 16; Berger, supra note 23, at 175-76. Holmes apparently espoused
the test in Pennsylvania Coal, stating, "One factor for consideration in determining
such limits . . . is the extent of diminution." 260 U.S. at 413.
43. Sax, supra note 14, at 60; Michelman, supra note 24, at 1192.
44. Id.
180 [Vol. 21
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particular right or attribute reduced in value. As a result,
courts often answer the related but different question of what
is and is not "property." ' The various twigs of Justice Car-
dozo's notorious "bundle of sticks,"' 6 are commonly thought
of as "property" and yet they are not uniformly subject to
constitutional protection.47 This ad hoc decision-making on
what constitutes "property" often ends in tautologies. Instead
of asking whether a taking has occured, the courts instead in-
quire as to whether there is property being taken. This back-
door approach is aptly expressed in United States v. Willow
River Power Co.: "[b]ut not all economic interests are 'prop-
erty rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights' which
have the law back of them . . . whether it is a property right
is really the question to be answered."" In short, both the
proper application and focus of the test are easily
misunderstood.
The continuum approach to determining "takings" uses
the foregoing tests to discern whether a regulation has "gone
too far" and has become a taking. Each test is fraught with
problems. The physical invasion test is inadequate because it
stipulates compensation only for a narrow range of circum-
stances. The nuisance test is unsophisticated, cannot define
precisely what a nuisance is, and does not assign priorities to
potentially incompatible uses. The balancing test is both sub-
jective and imprecise while the diminution in value test is so
vastly misunderstood that courts are lured into focusing on
collateral issues. Furthermore, the diminution standard
should be applied only to measure the amount of just com-
pensation in eminent domain, and not to determine if a "tak-
ing" has occurred. Nevertheless, federal courts in large mea-
sure utilize the continuum theory's and do not treat the
45. Id.
46. "The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of owner-
ship is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound
from time to time." B. CAMozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WirTNGS
331 (M.E. Hall ed. 1947).
47. In academic circles there is a preference for sophisticated use of the word
"property" to denote the legal relationships among people with respect to things, or
to describe the institution or system of relationships within which "ownership" oc-
curs; "things" and the relationships among them are the subjects of property. RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Ch. 1, Introduction (1936).
48. 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
49. But see Nectow v. Cambridge, 299 U.S. 183 (1928).
1981]
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eminent domain power as qualitatively different from the po-
lice power.
The results of adherence to the continuum theory are
clearly demonstrated in two recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City5" and Kaiser Aetna v. United States.5 1 In both de-
cisions the Court was reduced to reciting in the guise of ratio-
nale a laundry list of considerations derived from the tests de-
scribed above, along with a series of potentially relevant
factors. The only firm position taken by the Court was to con-
cede that it has no set formula for evaluating a taking.5 2
IV. CASE LAW REFLECTING THE CONTINUUM AND
SEPARATION APPROACHES
A. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
The Penn Central case exemplifies the current continued
reliance of the United States Supreme Court on the contin-
uum approach. Penn Central, owner of the Beaux-Arts style
Grand Central Station building in New York City, proposed
to build a 55-story office tower atop the present building, but
was prohibited from completing construction according to the
plans it submitted, since to do so would violate restrictions
imposed by the city's Landmarks Law. 8
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated the issue in
the case to be whether "a city may . . . place restrictions on
the development of individual historic landmarks ... without
effecting a 'taking' requiring the payment of 'just compensa-
tion'." In attempting to analyze the claimants' request for
declaratory and injunctive relief from the operation of the
Landmarks Law and the alternative request for damages for
what was termed a "temporary taking"5 of their right to con-
struct the office tower, Brennan confessed:
50. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
52. 438 U.S. at 124.
53. Id. at 119; NEw YORK Criy, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976)
provides that properties designated as landmarks must be kept in "good repair" and
that a city commission must approve in advance any proposal to alter the exterior
architectural features of the structure or construct any exterior improvements on the
landmark site.
54. 438 U.S. at 107.
55. Id. at 119.
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[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop
any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than re-
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
. . . Indeed we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the gov-
ernment's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused
by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances
[in that] case.""
According to Justice Brennan, previous courts have followed
Holmes' model and have engaged in essentially ad hoc inquir-
ies using "factors that have particular significance" 57 to deter-
mine whether a taking has occurred. Some of these factors are
the impact the regulation has on the claimant's investment-
backed expectations; the character of the government's action
(e.g., physical invasion versus mere regulation of use); the ex-
tent to which the regulations advance the public health,
safety, and general welfare; the claimant's reasonable expecta-
tions as to what constitutes "property" for purposes of the
fifth amendment; and whether a public use is contemplated.
Addressing Penn Central's claims, the Court attempted to
focus simultaneously on the character of the government's
regulation and on the nature and extent of the interference
with the claimant's rights in the parcel as a whole." The
Court reasoned that Penn Central's right to build was not to-
tally denied since the company could transfer its development
rights to another location, and hence, the city's Landmarks
Law did not constitute a taking. This reasoning demonstrates
the dilemma courts experience when using the continuum the-
ory to evaluate an alleged taking of "property." Although the
logic of the Penn Central decision rests on the assumption
that not all the value of pre-existing air rights was "taken" by
operation of the statute, there is little real support for that
position. Penn Central was clearly deprived of all of the air
rights over its property. To reach its conclusion that no taking
had occurred, the Court was forced to stress the availability
and value of the transferrable development rights created by
56. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
.57. Id.
58. Id. at 124, 136-38.
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the Landmarks Law.59 The availability of development rights
transfers, however, is more germane to an analysis of the rea-
sonableness of the regulation than it is to a valuation ques-
tion.e0 Had the Court analyzed more thoroughly the reasona-
bleness of the Landmarks Law, it would undoubtedly have
reached the same end point by a less circuitous route.
The Penn Central Court admitted that it was simultane-
ously attempting to define a "taking" and to determine if one
had occurred. The Court then proceeded with an ad hoc ap-
plication of "significant factors." The Court avoided the tortu-
ous and often arbitrary judicial sleight of hand attendant in
redefining "property" and "non-property" by focusing on the
value of the transferable development rights. Yet other courts
have avoided dealing with the logical impossibility of defining
and deciding a "taking" at the same time by viewing eminent
domain as a power distinct from the police power.
B. Kaiser Aetna v. United States
The Court again relied on Justice Holmes' continuum
theory in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.e The case holds
that the fifth amendment's taking clause precludes the federal
government from using the Commerce Clause6 to require
public access to certain navigable waters, without first paying
just compensation. In Kaiser Aetna a private pond was dredg-
ed and opened to a navigable bay which was then developed
for use as a private marina. Even though the marina consti-
tuted navigable water subject to federal regulations under the
Commerce Clause, the Court held that a "taking" requiring
compensation had occurred when public access was imposed.
The decision in Kaiser Aetna is essentially fair in view of
the developers' large expenditures and their reliance on Army
Corps of Engineers advice.6 8 Yet historically, due to the over-
59. Transferable Development Rights (TDR) permit a property owner to detach
his development rights from an unusable location and shift them to another lot
(called a receiving lot) where development is permitted. The TDR's scheme is based
on the notion that development rights are an essential component of the value of the
underlying property because they constitute one of the economic uses to which the
property may be put.
60. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
61. 444 U.S. at 174-75.
62. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which reads in part: "To regulate Commerce
.. .among the several states ......
63. The Court pointed out that claimants "had invested millions of dollars."
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whelming presumption of validity attaching to federal laws
made pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause,6' regula-
tion of navigable waters have not been regarded as takings.
An alternative analysis might have equated the provision of
public access with physical invasion," thus giving the Court a
more principled method of reaching the same result.
Kaiser Aetna pits the investment-backed expectations of
a landowner against the most presumptively valid of all regu-
lations, those made specifically pursuant to constitutional
mandates. Perhaps fear of failure in the face of this presump-
tion led the claimants to frame their suit in terms of damages
for inverse condemnation rather than for declaratory relief. It
appears that the claimants did not include the latter cause of
action in their pleadings at all.
Kaiser Aetna is also significant for the way in which it
attempts to decide the taking question. It represents another
occasion on which the Court was compelled to form an ad hoc
definition of the right of the landowner to exclude others as a
property right" "taken" by the imposition of a public right.
Once again, the Court misused the diminution in value
standard by focusing on the loss of investment-backed expec-
tations to define a taking, rather than using diminution of
value as a measure of the amount of compensation due. Had
the separate powers approach been employed, the Court's
analysis would have centered on determining the reasonable-
ness of the servitude as applied to the claimants' marina. The
case would logically have taken the posture of a mandamus
action. In all likelihood, the Court would have found the im-
position of the navigational servitude to be arbitrary and un-
reasonable, especially in view of the private nature of the
pond under Hawaiian law. Accordingly, the appropriate rem-
edy would have been a declaration that the claimants were
exempt from the navigational servitude over the marina.
444 U.S. at 169.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, which reads in part: "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.
65. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
66. 444 U.S. at 178. The court used United States v. Willow River Power, 324
U.S. 499 (1945), as the basis for its rationale.
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C. Separate Functions Suggest Different Remedies
Lately, some state supreme courts have returned to Jus-
tice Harlan's separate powers approach to decide cases in
which a regulation allegedly has worked a taking." Courts
which have resuscitated the separate powers approach focus
first on the type of governmental interference and then on the
appropriate remedy. These courts do not focus simultaneously
on both elements as a court adhering to the continuum ap-
proach must.
One useful way to consider the type of situation in which
inverse condemnation damages may be recovered is first to
identify the two major variables in taking cases: 1) the nature
of the harm caused to the property (i.e., whether or not a
physical invasion has occurred), and 2) the nature of the gov-
ernmental action causing the harm (i.e., regulatory or non-reg-
ulatory). The following chart68 should aid in visualizing this
approach.
67. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979), a/f'd, 446 U.S. - (1980); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
508, 542 P.2d 237, 127 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); Fred F. French Investing Co., v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 350 N.E. 2d 381, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 5, appeal dismissed,
(1976).
68. The verbal equivalent of this graphic representation is outlined in Note,
supra note 19, at 1146-47.
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CHART I
NATURE OF HARM NATURE OF ACTION EXAMPLE
Physical invasion Non-regulation Land flooded by
water projectA
Physical invasion Regulation Property destroyed
in mistaken belief
it constituted a
nuisanceB
Non-physical Non-regulation Gold mine closed by
invasion (administrative or government order
executive action) because miners
needed elsewhere
in work forceC
Intermittent Non-regulation Aircraft overflightsD
physical invasion
Non-physical Regulation Zoning ordinanceE
interference
A. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1900).
B. McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 101 (1926).
C. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
D. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See also United States v. Bydlon,
175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
E. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),
aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
In cases of both regulatory and non-regulatory physical
invasions, inverse condemnation damages will lie to remedy
the taking.69 Intermittent physical invasions caused by non-
regulations are also compensable. Just compensation, then, is
available in three categories out of four.
The availability of just compensation in the last category,
police power enactments which do not involve a physical in-
terference, e.g., zoning ordinances, are the center of the pre-
sent controversy. Not suprisingly, this type of regulation has
provided the impetus for vast amounts of inverse condemna-
tion action. As the chart illustrates, however, the governmen-
tal action causing the alleged harm in zoning actions is regula-
tion. Under the separate powers analysis, regulations should
be examined solely as an exercise of the police power; if found
69. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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to be so arbitrary or unreasonable7 0 as to bear no rational re-
lationship to the general health, safety, or welfare, such regu-
lations should be declared void and the landowner granted de-
claratory relief. Because an ultra vires regulation does not
become an eminent domain action, a claimant may not re-
cover monetary damages. Thus, under the separate powers ra-
tionale, the police power is treated as qualitatively distinct
from the power of eminent domain. The diminution in value
test is not used to test a regulation but is relegated to its
proper application of determining the amount of compensa-
tion to which a claimant in inverse condemnation is entitled.
When diminution in value is no longer a police power issue,
the sole question becomes whether the property owner is enti-
tled to declaratory relief from arbitrary legislative acts with
the "reasonableness" standard applied to non-invasionary reg-
ulations to test their conformity with police power objectives.
While clarifying the approach to the taking question, the
separate powers theory does not address the thorny problem
of pinpointing reasonableness criteria. An examination of two
California cases, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,71 and Agins v.
City of Tiburon 7 will go far to illustrate the utility of the sep-
arate powers analysis in isolating appropriate remedies by
clearly identifying the sovereign power being exercised.
1. HFH: The California Supreme Court Confronts the
Holmesian Confusion
In HFH plaintiffs contended that a zoning ordinance en-
acted by the City of Cerritos had sharply reduced the market
value of their land7 1 thus giving rise to an action for damages
in inverse condemnation. Noting that California courts "have
not hesitated to validate claims appropriately employing this
70. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), defining the test of a valid
regulation: "To justify the state. . . in thus interposing its authority on behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
71. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 127 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
72. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); but see Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976) disapproved in Agins.
73. The market value was reduced from about $380,000 to $75,000. 15 Cal. 3d at
512, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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theory of recovery, '74 the court reiterated that the diminution
in value standard applies to eminent domain valuations and
then concluded, "we have never, however, suggested that in-
verse condemnation lay to challenge a zoning action whose
only alleged effect was a diminution in the market value of
the property in question. '75
Significantly, the claimant in HFH did not assert bad
faith on the part of the city in its zoning action. Wrongfulness
of the government's action is not a relevant question in in-
verse condemnation actions.e If a taking has occurred under
the California state constitution's article I, section 19,7 com-
pensation is due without inquiry into the motives of the pub-
lic agency.
HFH tacitly holds that invalid police power regulations
cannot be transmuted into valid eminent domain actions. One
of the two exceptions to this rule is that of a claimant alleging
diminution in market value caused by "inequitable precon-
demnation actions by the public agency. 7 8 The court cited
Klopping v. City of Whittier 9 and Peacock v. County of Sac-
ramento"s as examples of this type of activity.
This willingness to characterize "inequitable precon-
demnation actions" as eminent domain actions is an apparent
contradiction to the separation of police power and eminent
domain functions embodied in HFH. But this inconsistency
may be reconciled by noting that the clear intent of the public
agencies in Klopping and Peacock was to devalue the prop-
erty prior to acquiring it for public use. Employment of a two-
step process of downzoning and subsequent condemnation
74. Id. at 513, 542 P.2d at 240-41, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
75. Id. at 514, 542 P.2d at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
76. Id. at 516 n.13, 542 P.2d at 243 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.13 (citing Holtz
v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970)).
77. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19 provides in part:
Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when
just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been
paid to, or into court for, the owner.
78. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243 n.14, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.14.
79. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972). The city made public
announcements of intent to acquire claimant's land and then delayed commencement
of eminent domain proceedings; the property predictably became commercially
valueless.
80. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969). The county refused develop-
ment of the land and even barred growth of vegetation, while giving assurances that
it intended to acquire the land for an airport.
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cannot mask the fact of the government's ultimate intention
to proceed in eminent domain. In fact, the court in Kopping
held that the plaintiff's eminent domain damages should in-
clude the decline in property value which is attributable to
the city's unreasonable actions. The second exception to the
HFH rule is that a public agency cannot employ a zoning or-
dinance to evade the requirement that the state must acquire
property which it uses for public purposes. This exception
falls into the area of physical invasions, which are always
compensable 1
Perhaps in deference to Pennsylvania Coal, the HFH
court averred that it did not base its conclusion on the verbal
distinction between "taking" and "police power,"82 but rather
utilized an analysis of the benefits and burdens inherent in
zoning. Yet the court employed the substantive distinction, as
the rationale of the case is unmistakably oriented to assessing
the reasonableness of the zoning regulation. HFH laid the
groundwork for Agins, which clearly rejected the continuum
theory and espoused the separate sovereign powers approach.
2. Agins v. City of Tiburon
Because HFH left open the possibility that a landowner
might be entitled to compensation in the event a zoning regu-
lation prohibited substantially all use of his land,88 it perpetu-
ated some doubts about the credibility of the continuum the-
ory in California.
The California Supreme Court squarely addressed this re-
maining issue in Agins v. City of Tiburon and concluded that
a landowner may not recover damages under the theory of in-
verse condemnation for excessive police power regulation. 4 A
landowner contesting the validity of such regulations may
challenge their constitutionality and may seek an order invali-
dating the ordinance in general or as specifically applied to an
affected property.
In so holding, the court openly acknowledged the Holme-
81. 15 Cal. 3d at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243 n.14, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.14. The
court cited Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 328
(1963), where an ordinance arguably prohibited structures or vegetation more than
three inches high on land over which aircraft were operated.
82. 15 Cal. 3d at 522, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
83. Id. at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16.
84. 24 Cal. 3d at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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sian assumptions' and flatly rejected it,"6 relying on Nichols'
authoritative treatise on eminent domain: "Such legislation is
an invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly un-
reasonable and arbitrary. It is invalid as an exercise of emi-
nent domain since no provision is made for compensation. '87
Valid exercises of eminent domain, then, include provision for
payment.
After holding that inverse condemnation is never an ap-
propriate remedy for unreasonable or arbitrary regulation, the
Agins court went on to examine the question of whether the
claimant had established a right to declaratory relief. The
court set out a test for determining when an ordinance is un-
constitutional and subject to invalidation. In order to award
declaratory relief, a court must find that the regulation works
to deprive the landowner of "substantially all reasonable use
of his property." 88 Because the Tiburon zoning ordinance, by
its terms, entitled the claimant to build up to five dwellings
on his land, the court concluded that as a matter of law he
was not deprived of substantially all reasonable use. Declara-
tory relief was therefore denied.
3. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York
New York courts have also applied the separate powers
approach in zoning cases. Declaratory relief was granted in
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York.8 There,
the New York Court of Appeals found that although the regu-
lation imposed so onerous a burden on the property as to de-
prive the owner of all reasonable use and economic value, the
regulation did not work a "taking." Rather, the regulation
caused a deprivation of property rights without due process df
law, and was therefore invalid.90
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 1.42(1).
88. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
89. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). In the French case
the issue was whether transferable development rights (see note 59 supra) were
"taken" by a zoning amendment, thus entitling the owner to damages in inverse con-
demnation. More specifically, a "buildable" private park, with development rights at-
tached to it, was rezoned exclusively as a park open to the public.
90. The court said:
While the police power of the State to regulate the the use of private
property by zoning is broad indeed, it is not unlimited. The State may
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The New York court, as did the court in Agins, examined
the Holmesian assumption, termed it metaphorical"1 and cau-
tioned that such a "metaphor should not be confused with the
reality. '92 After reiterating the same exceptions that HFH
enumerated,93 the court concluded:
Absent factors of governmental displacement of private
ownership, occupation or management, there was no "tak-
ing" within the meaning of constitutional limitations
.... Since there was no taking within the meaning of
constitutional limitations, plaintiffs remedy ... would
be a declaration of the amendment's invalidity, if that be
the case. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the
zoning amendment was a valid exercise of the police
power under the due process clauses of the State and
Federal Constitutions."
Because the court in French adopted the separate sovereign
powers approach it was able to isolate declaratory relief as the
appropriate remedy. It then analyzed the reasonableness of
the zoning regulation. Since the owner was unable to move the
development rights to another parcel," the court found that
the owner was deprived of "all but a bare residue" of value.'
Therefore, the regulation was unconstitutional.
New York and California courts have put forth a clear,
analytical method under which separate sovereign powers gen-
erate different legal results. Yet the United States Supreme
Court seems resigned to, if not entirely pleased with, its
multi-focal, continuum-oriented approach, as evidenced by its
treatment of Agins on appeal.97 In an opinion relying heavily
not, under the guise of regulation by zoning, deprive the owner of the
...use of his property and thus destroy all but a bare residue of its
economic value. Such an exercise of the police power would be void as
violative of the due process clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions.
Id. at 591, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
91. Id. at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
92. Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
94. Id. at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
95. The development rights were left floating, in a marvelously surreal manner,
over mid-town Manhattan, "disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity, float[ing]
in a limbo until restored to reality by reattachment to tangible property." Id. at 598,
350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The present owner had no parcel or place to
"plant" the rights.
96. Id. at 596, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
97. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
[Vol. 21
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
on the role of California's state Supreme Court in interpreting
state law as applied to Tiburon's zoning ordinance, the Court
cursorily analyzed the fact situation in which Agins arose. It
then noted, quoting Kaiser Aetna, that "no precise rule deter-
mines when property has been taken,"98 before settling on a
balancing of social gains against individual losses as the
proper focus for its analysis.
While the balancing approach is an appropriate method
for determining the reasonableness of legislation, the Court
here seemed to utilize it to determine whether a taking had
occurred, and thus showed that it relied implicitly on the con-
tinuum model. Hinting that a taking might have occurred if
the Tiburon ordinance "prevented the best use of appellant's
land," or "extinguish[ed] a fundamental attribute of owner-
ship," '99 the Court nevertheless held that the ordinance was
constitutional and did not deny appellants the "'justice and
fairness' guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 100 The Court therefore did not reach the question of
whether inverse condemnation damages may be available or
whether the state may limit the landowner's remedies to man-
damus and declaratory judgment.
It is not clear why the Court agreed to review Agins, if
not to consider the availability of inverse condemnation dam-
ages as a cause of action in zoning circumstances. The Court,
however, recently heard oral arguments in another California
case, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego'0 1
that involves issues substantially similar to those in Agins, al-
though arising in a somewhat different posture.
San Diego G & E is concerned with the downzoning of
land purchased by the utility for possible future construction
of a power plant. The San Diego City Council downzoned a
portion of the land from industrial to agricultural use
designating the agricultural zone for further industrial devel-
opment. The city then adopted, as required by state law, 02 an
open space element to its general plan and included San Di-
ego G & E's acreage in it. The utility brought suit in inverse
98. Id. at 260-61.
99. Id. at 262 (referring to United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, and Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
100. Id. at 263.
101. 49 U.S.L.W. 3423 (1980).
102. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(a), (c) (West Supp. 1979).
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condemnation,0 8 alleging that the zoning regulations, com-
bined with the open space element of the general plan, had
rendered the property useless.
The city appealed from a trial court finding that a com-
pensable taking had occurred. The state court of appeals af-
firmed. On appeal to the California Supreme Court the case
was retransferred to the court of appeals for reconsideration
in light of Agins. In an unpublished opinion, the court of ap-
peals then reversed its earlier holding. A further hearing by
the state supreme court was denied, and the utility brought
the case to the United States Supreme Court on appeal.
The key distinction between Agins and San Diego G & E
seems to be that in the latter case the only issue before the
Court is the availability of inverse condemnation damages,
since the declaratory relief and mandamus issues were not ad-
dressed by the trial court in its findings of fact. The trial
court in San Diego G & E found both that the best use of the
land was industrial and that the land had "been devoted to
use by the public as open space."10' Thus, the Court is in a
position to reach the unanswered question in Agins of
whether the state may limit the landowner's remedies.
In light of the Court's strong dictum that it might have
decided Agins differently had the ordinances in question ei-
ther prevented the best use of the land or extinguished an es-
sential attribute of property ownership, the Court in San Di-
ego G & E has a principled basis to hold that in this context,
zoning that reduces market value may give rise to a cause of
action in eminent domain.
The effect of such a decision would be to ratify the con-
tinuum approach, as well as to limit the California Supreme
Court opinion to its holding that the zoning ordinance in
Agins was not facially unconstitutional.
103. The utility in its complaint also sought declaratory relief and mandamus,
alleging arbitrary exercise of police power, but the trial court did not include findings
of fact on these issues.
104. Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the San Diego
County Superior Court, April 9, 1976.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE CONTINUUM AND SEPARATE POWERS THEORIES
A. The Continuum Orientation
In addition to the body of law following Holmes' state-
ment 05 it can be argued that the language of the opinions al-
lowing inverse condemnation as a remedy in the three clas-
ses-physical invasions, non-physical or intermittent
invasions by regulations, and physical invasions by non-regu-
latory government actions-described in Chart I, may be
broad enough to support the extension of this remedy to zon-
ing regulation cases. Further, some commentators' 6 have ar-
gued that since legislative land use restrictions such as zoning
should be imposed only if it can clearly be demonstrated that
gains flowing from the restrictions outweigh their costs, the
availability of inverse condemnation "helps strike a balance"
by reminding legislative bodies of the unplanned-for liability
resulting from careless or irrational land use regulations.
On a more practical level, the availability of inverse con-
demnation gives the claimant one more bite of the apple; he
may plead two causes of action rather than only one, perhaps
thereby multiplying his chances for success in court. On the
other hand, pleading dual causes of action may prove ex-
tremely taxing. A court oriented toward a simultaneous focus
on the character of the government's action and the extent of
its interference with the claimant's parcel as a whole uses an
admittedly ad hoc, fact-oriented list of "various significant
factors." Therefore, the attorney trusted to draft the com-
plaint may face an impossible burden. Indeed, if both causes
are allowed, the entire success of the case depends on the
cleverness of the attorney's drafting, since there is no assur-
ance that declaratory relief will be favored over inverse con-
demnation damages-or vice versa-except to the extent that
one or the other may be shown to be appropriate based on the
facts at hand.
105. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
106. See Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238 (1960); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
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B. The Separate Powers Theory
Adoption of the viewpoint that regulations flowing from
the police power are qualitatively different from actions in
eminent domain, and that an invalid regulation cannot be-
come a valid taking simplifies the classification of virtually all
potential "taking" cases by focusing the inquiry on the nature
of the harm and the type of governmental action. Only in zon-
ing-type cases involving non-physical interference by regula-
tion will there be any doubt; in all other cases inverse con-
demnation damages would be available, and the court could
proceed to (albeit difficult) valuation assessments. In regula-
tory actions, those cases falling under the two HFH excep-
tions of "inequitable precondemnation activity" and regula-
tions providing for public use of property, should be treated
as takings as well, thus leaving only purely regulatory actions
such as zoning to be examined for potential declaratory relief.
Adherence to systematic classification, that incidentally
narrows the number of cases for which inverse condemnation
damages may be awarded, helps preserve reliance on budget-
ary judgments at the local level. While decisions as to the
amount of compensation to be awarded are properly judicial,
decisions as to compensability should properly be legisla-
tive. 107 In the absence of clear criteria as to what constitutes a
taking, legislative bodies find it difficult to weigh the potential
costs of any proposed policy; thus legislatures would be as-
sisted by a clear determination of which cases are to be con-
sidered as takings.108
Since the separate sovereign powers orientation avoids ad
hoc decision-making of the type alluded to in Penn Central,
the claimant's attorney can work with an integrated body of
law, and, since the relief sought is merely from the operation
of a statute, the complaint becomes somewhat simpler to
frame. The claimant is indirectly benefited because munici-
palities not faced with unexpected reallocation of public funds
to satisfy inverse condemnation awards will not have to cur-
tail public services or take on new debt. Thus, the claimant
107. The expenditure of public funds is not an appropriate function for two
reasons: not only are courts ill-equipped in terms of time, personnel, and basic insti-
tutional personality to debate and consider a range of possible community interests
and solutions, but on another level, separation of powers doctrine dictates that since
courts, like the executive branch, cannot tax, they cannot properly spend.
108. See note 19 supra.
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may rely on both the quality and the cost of living in his
community.
Yet the reality of the relief embodied in declaratory relief
is founded on faith in the continued functioning of the demo-
cratic system over time, and in a reliance on long-term fair-
ness rather than on a compensatory bird in the hand even at
the expense of proper fiscal governmental functioning.
As the United States Supreme Court observed more than
fifty years ago,
[P]roblems have developed, and constantly are develop-
ing, which require, and will continue to require, addi-
tional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wis-
dom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to exisit-
ing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uni-
formly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the
complex conditions of our day .... And in this there is
no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional
guaranties [sic] never varies, the scope of their applica-
tion must expand or contract to meet the new and differ-
ent conditions which are constantly coming within the
field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossi-
ble that it should be otherwise.10e
Rapid urban development and the necessity of preserving
scarce resources mandate the development of a clear and use-
able standard for determining takings. Fiscal responsibility
demands that compensability decisions be left to legislative
bodies.
Using the simple analytical device provided by two con-
stitutional clauses, one for traditional takings, the other for
reviewing regulations to obtain declaratory relief, courts and
claimants should find it easier to assess the propriety of any
potential cause of action. Continued adherence to the contin-
uum theory only perpetuates the difficulty of having to define
a "taking" while simultaneously reviewing the evidence to see
if one has occurred.
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